侯活士论实践智慧

A Discussion of the Phronesis of Hauerwas

Wai-tung CHO

A contemporary challenge in ethical studies is to establish a rational foundation or criteria for judging right from wrong, virtuous from wicked. Stanley Hauerwas points out that ethical theory is not suited to the task of identifying the rational foundation for morality because behavior cannot simply be justified by theory. Upholding the idea that narrative is the key to ethical reflection, he argues that in the absence of narrative the interpretation of moral experience in ethical reflection is flawed.

Many, including James Gustafson, in turn, criticize Hauerwas' promotion of ethical reflection from the perspective of Christian narrative. His critics charge that if all moral questionings are relative to a certain “particular” narrative rationality, it will be impossible to advance any arbitration of “public” rationality between two different traditions, for a rationality with narrative as its foundation can deny the external objective truth altogether.

This article aims to defend Hauerwas' perspective by showing that he has not given up any notion of objective truth through his interpretation and elaboration of phronesis. As a matter of fact, Hauerwas points out how closely narrative is related to truth issues and how it can contribute to possible conditions for truth. By elaborating on several major ideas of Hauerwas, such as narrative vision, narrative rationality, phronesis, and the truthfulness of phronesis, this article seeks to elucidate the alternative rationality and exposition of the concept of truth advocated by Hauerwasian ethics.