What Is (Not) Public Theology?

I

　　What actually is “public theology,” a theology that has emerged in the last twenty years in western theological circles? Can we even say that there is such a thing as “public theology”? In English, it is sometimes referred to as “public theology” and at other times as “theology of the public.” Of course, we cannot adequately determine the meaning of “public theology,” a discipline of western theological studies by merely examining the two terms coined for this movement. Before I continue, I want to make it clear that in this short article I do not attempt to examine the “public theology” of the west but merely offer to share my personal reflections. I begin by examining the traditional usage of these two English terms to give my personal answer to the question: “What is public theology?” I will do this by providing a negative definition of what is not “public theology” and then go on to contrast its positive and affirmative meanings.

II

　　What is the actual difference between “public theology” and “theology of the public”? To answer this question, we turn to a pair of more established terms: “natural theology” and “theology of nature.” In simple terms, “natural theology” means that it is through understanding the natural world that we come to understand God who creates this world. As for “theology of nature,” though the Chinese translation is the same, the meaning is different. It means “to think about the natural world from a theological perspective.” Similarly, in the term “public theology,” do we first begin from the “public sphere” and then make inquiries for a theological answer? Will such an approach fall into a pattern that allows the “public sphere” to set the theological agenda that somehow constrains our theological thinking about the “public sphere”? This implies that when we use “public sphere” as a starting point, we will need to maintain a certain view of the “public sphere;” otherwise, we will reduce this term and its usage to something formal and hollow, totally lacking any solid meaning. This being the case, how can this approach prevent us from following our pre-conceived notions about the “public sphere” and thus limiting our theological thinking about the “public sphere”? Therefore, to take one step backward, we can only, at the very most, accept the descriptive dimension of the “public sphere” as a starting point for our thinking. As for establishing a norm for theological analysis and casting judgment, we must choose one from the theological sphere, not from any other sphere.

　　Having established this criteria, we may take “public theology” to mean “theology of the public.” We start from a theological perspective to understand what “public sphere” means and attempt to modify or revise the existing view by imposing a theological view. This approach shows that theology itself holds a certain view of the “public sphere” and establishes the idea that theology must not be subsumed under the domain of any other subject. Stated more broadly, all views on the “public sphere” must originate out of a particular subject. This is to ensure that the relationship between theology and other subjects will not become a subordination relationship; neither discipline must be subordinate to the other. The viewpoints representing each of the two disciplines begin from their own particular standpoints so that through continual dialogue they can come to a clear understanding of each other’s viewpoint. In this way, the so called “public theology” is in fact not “public” in any absolute way but “public” as it is understood from a particular standpoint and therefore different from the “public” understood from all the other standpoints. In other words, the study of the “public sphere” is not confined itself to a certain discipline, and there is no overriding advantage of choosing a certain discipline whose study methods are preferable to those of other disciplines.

III

　　The above description implies that there can be no neutral “public sphere.” Apart from the fact that there exists a “public” understood from a particular standpoint, there is another more important reason. It is that within this “public sphere,” there exists all kinds of particular, irreducible standpoints. In order to enter this “public sphere,” Christian “public theology,” as it is Christian and theological, need not apologize for giving its views on all matters regarding this “public sphere” and need not eradicate its own particularity. Here, I want to make it clear that “public theology” does not seek to set up an objective, universal theology. It is true that there are all kinds of existing standpoints within the “public sphere.” But we need not feel obligated first to set up a foundation acceptable to and approved by those representing the various standpoints to reach a consensus. This would reduce all the standpoints to a single standpoint, thus denying the particularity of each of the various standpoints. The result would be that “public theology” will become just an all-embracing discourse.

　　However, to emphasize particularity and to refrain from coming to a consensus need not end communication among those involved in dialogue. It is only that this communication is not based on certain common points. The aim is only to ensure that this communication not be based on some universal point of view. We are only making it clear that Christian “public theology” needs to begin from its own particularity and to point out that there is no need to establish some universal standpoint before initiating dialogue. To begin communication from each one’s particularity allows everyone to become conscious of a person’s standpoint being different from those of others. This can help avoid the natural tendency to read the viewpoints of others from one’s personal perspective. Then as both sides listen carefully, they can quickly differentiate the particularities of all the views represented. This allows participants to understand another discipline by recognizing the differences while at the same time coming to a deeper and more objective understanding of one’s own. This is an epistemology which is difference-oriented and is therefore contrary to one seeking to establish a universal foundation. We must then expect the “public theology” arising from this approach will not be a kind of method-ism. Such an approach emphasizes the importance of methods and adopts certain objective and universally-used methods. On the contrary, this “public theology” takes its particular theological viewpoint as the norm for applying its method. Said another way, its method originates from its own particular theological perspective. Its ideas will not be reversed just because the object of analysis and explanation is “public theology;” so its theological perspective would not be tempered by certain objectives and universal methods.

IV

　　The study of “public sphere” cannot demand that the method used must also be “public” just because the object under study is the “public sphere.” This can only be a fictitious demand. What lies behind such a demand is an objective and universal method-ism. Similarly, we also cannot say that just because the object of study is the “public sphere,” that this “public theology” ought to be different from “the theology of the church.” This is no doubt a kind of “public” and “private” dichotomous thought pattern which includes the “church” in the category of “private” and which separates and classifies the sphere outside the “church” as “public.” According to this line of reasoning we would end up with two kinds of theology. We can only find ourselves puzzled by such a pattern of reasoning. As I see it, the crux of the problem is clear: who does the theology? From the standpoint of Christian faith, could it be said that it is the community of faith, meaning the church, which is qualified to do theology? The reason the church has a legitimate status to do theology is that she has come into being because of her belief in the salvific activities of the triune God. If the church is the only legitimate and qualified body to do theology, then it will certainly not be possible to have any “public theology” that differs from “the theology of the church.” If this be the case, there must be another community outside the church who will do “public theology.” But then we must ask: what is the legitimacy of this community? This is the first question. Perhaps the problem needs also to be tackled from yet another angle. Does the church itself need to do another “public theology” beyond “the theology of the church”? Does this mean that what is “public” is the way of life led by other communities outside the “church.” Does this also suggest the communal life of the “church” is not “public” or at least not the “public” shared by other communities? To go this route would imply that “the theology of the church” is not “public” so that it may not correspond to the “public sphere” outside the church. Considering this approach brings up yet another problem.

　　Does a public sphere exist completely outside the church? Can we say there is yet another public sphere outside the church? The question involves knowing where we stand when we make such a judgment. Does some standpoint exist outside and above the faith community that is more objective, more universal and even more transcendent? Should such a standard be used to delineate, examine and assess the boundaries of the “public sphere”? If our answers to these questions are in the affirmative, can we decide that “the theology of the church” and “public theology” are two distinct spheres in theology as the former focuses on the area within the church while the latter, on areas outside the church? Or in fact, outside the church, is there no public, or may we say that outside the church there is another public? All this is certainly not a problem of space or of regional boundary. We must say that church life itself is public and this answers our first question. We can make a bolder claim, the public-ness of church life itself can be applied to examine and assess the public-ness of other communal life outside the church. This answers the question that follows. Seeing the problem from the church’s perspective, we can at most offer the criticizm that the public-ness embraced by “the theology of the church” has not yet been fully developed. At the same time, we cannot set up a “public theology” apart from “the theology of the church” or break away from “the theology of the church.” Taking serious the faith of the church, I cannot personally imagine that outside the church there can be any public; at the same time, I am able to grant the fact that outside the church there cannot be another public. From the church’s perspective and based on the faith of its members, there can be no public that can properly be called public; from the perspective of the church, there is no alternative public outside the church that is in accordance with our Christian faith.

V

　　“Public theology” should neither be reduced to a product under the dichotomous theory nor the outcome of a search for objectivity and universality. From section two to section four in my above discussion, I try to handle some biased viewpoints and identify some of the questionable presuppositions behind these views. Apart from the dichotomous pair, “public” and “private,” there is a closely related dichotomous pair, the “outward-oriented” and the “inward-oriented.” The reason for developing “public theology” for this kind of dichotomous theory is that the church is considered too inward-oriented, always confined to the church’s four walls and too often neglecting her social responsibility, failing miserably to be the salt and light within the local community and society at large. In fact, the issue of the church’s social responsibility to transform or bring renewal to its local community is the very nucleus of “public theology.” Due to the limits of space, I have chosen not to discuss this issue at this time. Let us instead go back to a more basic question involving the dichotomy of being “outward-oriented” or “inward-oriented.” For the church to accept this dichotomy would be to ignore the essential relationship between the church’s outward-oriented aspect and its inward-oriented aspect. We must be quick to point out that the church must not divide her inward orientation from her outward orientation. The church must never become so outward-oriented that she totally denies the crucial function of her inward orientation. In other words, she must never focus entirely on her outward praxis. As in our discussion of the dichotomy of “public” and “private” above, we must be cautious not to break away entirely from the church’s distinct public-ness in our discussion or in the development of her “public theology.”

　　At this point, we must go on to determine what norms and constraints should be employed as we set out to develop a “public theology” that breaks away from the church’s “public-ness.” We must seek to understand, in discussing the outward praxis of the church, what kind of norms or constraints must be followed in order to build and develop such a “public theology.” The church’s inward public life originates out of the salvific work of the triune God in whom she believes, and she continues to be regulated and guided by the salvific acts of the triune God. The church’s inward public life which includes preaching and listening, instruction and learning, and putting into practice the word of God, all as her effort to follow Jesus Christ as His disciple community. The entire church’s inward public life is actually a communal life empowered through the Holy Spirit and formed by Jesus Christ to whom the Bible testifies. This is the public-ness of the church’s life as mentioned earlier. From this we can see that breaking away from the church’s inward orientation and focusing upon her outward orientation would be like taking “a fish out of water.” The “public theology” built on such a foundation can only be hollow and abstract. It would lack a concrete, lively community group to embody and provide a frame of reference and to give witness to. This kind of “public theology” lacks the authority to make exaggerated claims about the church’s outward oriented practice. Neither does it have the right to downgrade the church or suggest that she neglects her work of nurturing or forming its inwardly-oriented public life. Lacking this authority, this “public theology” will be no more than a concept, lacking a corresponding faith community to serve as a lively embodiment of the church’s public life. This can only lead inevitably to self-negation, the opposite of transformation and renewal that can be found in the church and which the church seeks to live out. As a result, the demonstration effect of this kind of “public theology” will be greatly reduced.

VI

　　From the above discussion, we can briefly conclude what is not “public theology.” This can be summed up in two arguments. In the first argument, “public theology” cannot subsume under the category of objectivity and universality. This is an issue of theological epistemology and methodology. We cannot put “public theology” inside the objective and universal “public sphere” just because the object of this theology is “public,” and so we can forsake theology’s own particular standpoint and method. Indeed this is an issue that is bound up with theology or the doctrine of God. The second argument is that “public theology” cannot be placed in the dichotomous pattern of “public” and “private” or “outward-orientation” and “inward-orientation.” This “public theology” will only cause the church to break away from her distinct public life and fall into the trap of building and developing a kind of public different from the church’s public. This is an issue of ecclesiology. In this short article, I am only able to share a preliminary reflection on the problem of defining public theology. I attempt to come to a definition by pointing out the theological dimension and the church dimension of “public theology.” I also point out, in a negative, refutable way, “what public theology is (not)” as a starting point for a more in-depth exploration and scrupulous elaboration of the subject in the future.